Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority by Harrington, Joseph E, Jr
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Business Economics and Public Policy Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2-2005
Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an
Antitrust Authority
Joseph E. Harrington Jr
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers
Part of the Business Commons, Economics Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and
Public Administration Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/12
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harrington, J. E. (2005). Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority. International Economic Review, 46 (1),
145-169. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-6598.2005.00313.x
Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
Abstract
The dynamic behavior of a price-fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned about creating suspicions that a
cartel has formed. Consistent with preceding static theories, the cartel's steady-state price is decreasing in the
damage multiple and the probability of detection. However, contrary to those theories, it is independent of
the level of fixed fines. It is also shown that the cartel prices higher when a more competitive benchmark price
is used in calculating damages.
Disciplines
Business | Economics | Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/12
Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an
Antitrust Authority∗
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
Department of Economics





May 2001, Revised January 2003
JEL Classification: L1, L4
Key Words: Collusion, Cartel Detection, Antitrust
Abstract
The dynamic behavior of a price-fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned
about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed. The intertemporal structure
of the price path is characterized and the eﬀect of antitrust policy on the cartel’s
steady-state price is explored.
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1 Introduction
Since the beginning of FY 1997, the Antitrust Division has prosecuted inter-
national cartels aﬀecting over $10 billion in U.S. commerce ... [These cartels]
have been bigger, in terms of the volume of aﬀected commerce and the amount
of harm caused to American businesses and consumers, than any conspiracies
previously encountered by the Antitrust Division. [Annual Report, Antitrust
Division, United States Department of Justice, 1999: pp. 5-6]
International cartels are estimated to represent a drain of hundreds of millions
of euros on the European economy. ... Since 1998, the number of cartel
cases investigated by the Commission has increased dramatically. [European
Community Competition Policy, XXXth Report on Competition Policy, 2000:
pp. 24-25]
As these quotes from American and European antitrust authorities suggest, price-fixing
remains a perennial problem which makes it all the more important that we understand
when cartels form and, when they do form, how they behave. Though there is a volu-
minous theoretical literature on collusive pricing, an important dimension to price-fixing
cartels has received little attention. In light of the illegality of price-fixing, a critical
goal faced by a cartel is to avoid the appearance that there is a cartel. Firms
want to raise prices but not suspicions that they are coordinating their behavior. If high
prices or rapidly increasing prices or, more generally, anomalous price movements may
make customers and the antitrust authorities suspicious that a cartel is operating, one
would expect this to have implications for how the cartel prices.
This paper is the initial step in a research project whose objective is to explore cartel
pricing in the presence of detection considerations. Some of the questions to be addressed
include: What are the intertemporal properties of the collusive price path? How does
the decision to form a cartel and the properties of the collusive price path respond to
various instruments of antitrust policy? What types of industry traits make detection
more diﬃcult and what are the implications of those traits for cartel pricing?
Towards beginning to address these questions, this paper makes two contributions.
First, it characterizes the intertemporal structure to the joint profit maximizing price path
when two dynamics are at work - higher prices increase penalties in the event of detection
and bigger price changes make detection more likely. In spite of the potential complexity
of these dynamics, the cartel price path is shown to be monotonically increasing under
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general assumptions. The cartel gradually raises price as it balances oﬀ increasing profit
with increasing the probability of detection. The second contribution is to explore how
antitrust policy impacts the steady-state cartel price. While some results confirm existing
intuition about the impact of antitrust policy, some yield a new intuition. Comparative
statics on the steady-state price reveal that it is decreasing in the damage multiple and
the probability of detection; both of which confirm existing intuition. However, it is
independent of the level of fixed fines. Furthermore, if fines are the only penalty, the
cartel’s steady-state price is the same as in the absence of antitrust laws. The equivalence
between fines and damages found in previous work is then shown to break down in the
context of a dynamic model. A second surprising result is that a more stringent standard
for calculating damages actually increases the cartel’s steady-state price. Finally, this
model of detection is augmented by allowing both higher prices as well as bigger price
changes to make detection more likely. Numerical analysis reveals a unique and potentially
identifying pricing pattern - the cartel gradually raises price but then price moderately
declines to its steady-state value.
Related Work A few papers have investigated, in a static setting, optimal cartel
pricing under the constraint of possible detection. Block, Nold, and Sidak (1981) consider
a static oligopoly model in which the probability of detection depends on the price-cost
margin and the penalty is a multiple of above-normal profits. They show that the optimal
cartel price is below the monopoly price and that the cartel price is decreasing in the
penalty multiple and the level of enforcement expenditures (higher levels of which raise
the probability of detection). Spiller (1986), Salant (1987), and Baker (1988) extend the
static formulation to allow buyers to adjust their purchases under the anticipation that
they may be able to collect multiple damages if sellers are shown to have been colluding.
Also within a static setting, Besanko and Spulber (1989, 1990), LaCasse (1995), Polo
(1997), and Souam (2001) explore a context in which firms have private information,
which influences whether or not they collude, and either the government or buyers must
decide whether to pursue costly legal action. Three papers consider a dynamic setting.
Cyrenne (1999) modifies Green and Porter (1984) by assuming that a price war, and the
ensuing raising of price after the war, results in detection for sure and with it a fixed fine.
Spagnolo (2000) and Motta and Polo (2001) consider the eﬀects of leniency programs
on the incentives to collude when the probability of detection and penalties are both
fixed. Though considering collusive behavior in a dynamic setting with antitrust laws,
these papers exclude the sources of dynamics that are the foci of the current analysis;
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specifically, that the probability of detection and penalties are sensitive to firms’ pricing
behavior. It is that sensitivity that will generate predictions about cartel pricing dynamics.
2 Model
The representative firm’s profit when all firms charge a price of P ∈ Ω is denoted π (P )
where Ω is the set of feasible prices. If market demand is D (·) and a firm’s cost function
is C (·) then the profit function is π (P ) = P (D (P ) /n)−C (D (P ) /n) , given n ≥ 2 firms.
In the absence of the formation of a cartel, a symmetric equilibrium is assumed to exist
which entails a price of bP and firm profit of bπ ≥ 0.
If firms form a cartel, they meet to determine price. Assume these meetings, and any
associated documentation, provides the “smoking gun” if an investigation is pursued.1
The cartel is detected with some probability and incurs penalties in that event. Detection
can be viewed as the end of the horizon with a terminal payoﬀ of [bπ/ (1− δ)] −Xt − F
where Xt is a firm’s damages in the event the cartel is detected, F is any (fixed) fines,
and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.2 In this model, damages refers to any penalty that
is sensitive to the prices charged while fines refer to penalties that are fixed with respect
to the endogenous variables.3 If not detected, collusion continues on to the next period.
There is an infinite number of periods. Penalties are assumed to be suﬃciently bounded
from above for all histories so that the expected present value of a firm’s income stream
is always positive and thus bankruptcy is avoided.
A cartel member’s damages, denoted Xt for period t, are assumed to evolve in the
following manner:




where β ∈ [0, 1) , γ ≥ 0, (1)
1Though it is assumed that an investigation leads to conviction with probability one, all results would
go through if the probability of conviction is only required to be positive.
2One could allow for the cartel to be reestablished sometime in the future and I suspect many results
would not change. Of the 1300 firms indicted by the Department of Justice over 1962-1980, 14% were
recidivists (Bosch and Eckard, 1991).
3Though this use of the term "fines" is standard in the literature, in recent years U.S. Department of
Justice fines have become sensitive to the length of the cartel and the prices charged. Federal Sentencing
Guidelines provide for fines equal to 20% of the value of aﬀected commerce multiplied by a culpability
score which lies between 2 and 4 (American Antitrust Institute, 12/7/01). However, the sensitivity of
actual penalties at the margin is not so clear. For example, according to these guidelines, Hoﬀman-La
Roche should have been levied a penalty between $1.3 and 2.6 billion and it was instead required to
pay $500 million due to some final adjustment. Also, prison sentences are probably quite insensitive to
marginal changes in prices so that their monetary valuation would make up part of F .
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where P t is the cartel price. As time progresses, damages incurred in previous periods
become increasingly diﬃcult to document and 1−β measures the rate of the deterioration
of the evidence.4 x (P t) is the level of damages incurred in the current period where γ is
the multiple of damages that a firm can expect to pay if found caught colluding. While
U.S. antitrust law specifies treble damages, γ could be less than three because a case
is settled out-of-court. Single damages are not unusual for an out-of-court settlement.5
Current U.S. antitrust practice is x (P t) =
³
P t − bP´ (D (P t) /n) .6
Detection of a cartel can occur from many sources; some of which are related to price -
such as customer complaints - and some of which are unrelated to price - such as internal
whistleblowers.7 Hay and Kelley (1974) find that detection was attributed to a complaint
by a customer or a local, state, or federal agency in 13 of 49 price-fixing cases. In the recent
graphite electrodes case, it was reported that the investigation began with a complaint
from a steel manufacturer which is a purchaser of graphite electrodes (Levenstein and
Suslow, 2001). Anomalous pricing may cause customers to become suspicious and pursue
legal action or share their suspicions with the antitrust authorities.8 Though it isn’t
important for my model, I do imagine that buyers (in many price-fixing cases, they are
industrial buyers) are the ones who are becoming suspicious about collusion.
As a general rule, the [Antitrust] Division follows leads generated by disgrun-
tled employees, unhappy customers, or witnesses from ongoing investigations.
4Assuming a depreciation rate to damages is important analytically as it bounds the penalty. An
alternative approach is to impose a statute of limitations so that the damage penalty is the sum of
damages incurred over a bounded number of periods into the past. I conjecture the same type of insight
would emerge under such an assumption. I thank Ted O’Donoghue for making this suggestion. β can
also capture the fact that the real value of the damages declines over time as defendants are not required
to pay foregone interest; interest is applied only after the judicial determination of an antitrust violation.
Blackstone and Bowman (1987) estimate that this reduced the real value of damage penalties by around
50% in 1975 given the average length of a cartel around that time was 8.6 years.
5 See Connor (2001) and White (2001) for some estimates of damages associated with the lysine cartel.
Also see de Roos (1999) for an analysis of the lysine cartel.
6 "[After the] court selects a ’competitive price,’ [it] ... awards the plaintiﬀ the diﬀerence between the
competitive estimate and the amount paid, times the quantity purchased, trebled." (Breit and Elzinga,
1986, p. 21.)
7Bryant and Eckard (1991) estimate the chances of a price-fixing cartel being indicted in a 12-month
period to be around 15%.
8The Nasdaq case is one in which truly anomalous pricing resulted in suspicions about collusion.
It was scholars rather than market participants who observed that dealers avoided odd-eighth quotes
and ultimately explained it as a form of collusive behavior (Christie and Schultz, 1994). Though the
market-makers did not admit guilt, they did pay an out-of-court settlement of around $1 billion.
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As such, it is very much a reactive agency with respect to the search for crim-
inal antitrust violations. ... Customers, especially federal, state, and local
procurement agencies, play a role in identifying suspicious pricing, bid, or
shipment patterns. [McAnney, 1991, pp. 529, 530]
In modelling the detection process, there isn’t much relevant evidence to oﬀer guidance
and it is not well-understood how people identify anomalous events. I have then decided
to take a more agnostic approach by specifying a class of probability of detection functions
and exploring how properties of those functions influence cartel pricing dynamics. Letting
φ
¡
P t, P t−1
¢
denote the probability of detection in period t, it is allowed to depend on the
current price and the previous period’s price. One can interpret φ
³ bP, bP´ as a baseline
probability of detection driven by, for example, internal whistleblowers. The inclusion of
a more comprehensive price history would significantly complicate the analysis - greatly
expanding the state space - without any apparent gain in insight. Allowing just the most
recent past to matter is potentially significant, however, as price changes can then play a
role in detection.
This modelling of detection warrants some further discussion since it does not explicitly
model those agents who might engage in detection. The first point to make concerns





, and thereby two distinct sources of dynamics - detection
and antitrust penalties. As currently formulated, the model is rich enough to provide new
insight into cartel pricing dynamics, even with a simple modelling of the detection process,
and a more complex model at this stage is likely to prove intractable. Tractability issues
aside, there is another motivation for this approach. The objective of this paper is not to
develop insight and testable hypotheses about detection but rather about cartel pricing. A
good model of the detection process is then defined to be one that is a plausible description
of how cartel members perceive the detection process. To my knowledge, there is little
evidence from past cases that cartels hold a sophisticated view of buyers (which is implied
if one were to model buyers as strategic agents and derive an equilibrium). It strikes
me as quite reasonable that firms might simply postulate that higher prices or bigger
price changes result in a greater likelihood of creating suspicions without having derived
that relationship from first principles about buyers. Thus, even if this modelling of the
detection process is wrong, the resulting statements about cartel pricing may be accurate
if that model is a reasonable representation of firms’ perceptions.9
9Nor do I believe it is inconsistent to model firms as choosing prices optimally - as that is a statement
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In period 1, firms have the choice of forming a cartel, and risking detection and penal-
ties, or earning non-collusive profit of bπ. If they choose the former, they can, at any
time, choose to discontinue colluding. In that event, it is assumed they’ll never collude
again and receive a terminal payoﬀ of [bπ/ (1− δ)]− σ ¡P t−1,Xt−1¢ where the last period




is to be interpreted as the present value of
the expected penalty when collusion is discovered after the dissolution of the cartel (for
example, incidental discovery of incriminating documents in an unrelated legal case).
For the purposes of establishing the existence of an optimal cartel price path, the fol-
lowing assumptions are imposed. Additional structure will be required to derive properties
of that path.10
A1 π : Ω → < is bounded and continuously diﬀerentiable and ∃Pm > bP such that
π0 (P ) T 0 as P S Pm.
A2 x : Ω→ <+ is bounded, continuously diﬀerentiable, and non-decreasing.
A3 φ : Ω2 → [0, 1] is continuous.
A4 σ : Ω×<+ → <+ is bounded, continuous, and non-decreasing.
A5 Ω is a compact convex subset of <+ and
h bP, Pmi ⊆ Ω .
The cartel chooses an infinite price path so as to maximize the expected sum of dis-
counted income. To break indiﬀerence, firms are assumed to collude if they are indiﬀerent
between colluding and not colluding. It is important to emphasize that we do not ignore
the usual incentive compatibility constraints which ensure that a firm will go along with
the collusive price path. One can cast the preceding model as an infinite-horizon perfect
monitoring (though non-repeated) game played among the n firms. The joint profit-
maximizing price path that is characterized here is then the best symmetric equilibrium
price path when δ is suﬃciently close to one; that is, when these incentive compatibility
constraints do not bind. Given the complexity of the dynamics associated with detection
and antitrust penalties, it makes sense to initially characterize this price path which, as
the reader will see, is a substantive task in itself.
about what one thinks is best for one’s self - and, at the same time, suppose that firms do not derive
buyers’ optimal detection behavior - as that is a statement about what one thinks is best for others. An
agent may know what is best for themselves without having a clue as to what is best for someone else.
10 If x (P ) =
³
P − bP´ (D (P ) /n) then it could be decreasing for suﬃciently high prices which contradicts
A2. However, it is shown in Harrington (2001) that, under standard assumptions on demand and cost
functions, x is increasing for prices on the optimal price path.
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3 Existence of an Optimal Price Path
The basic problem is one of the cartel manager choosing a price path to maximize the
expected present value of the representative cartel member’s income stream. To establish
the existence of an optimal price path, dynamic programming is used. The state variables



























P, βXt−1 + γx (P )
¢
, (bπ/ (1− δ))− σ ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢ª .
(bπ/ (1− δ)) − βXt−1 − γx (P ) − F is the terminal payoﬀ associated with the cartel
being detected. Also note that firms have the future option of dismantling the cartel
and receiving a terminal payoﬀ of (bπ/ (1− δ))− σ ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢ . All proofs are in
Appendix A.
Theorem 1 Assume A1-A5. An optimal price path exists.





















is the probability of the cartel being discovered in period τ (which





is an aﬃne function ofXt−1. This property is used in the next result which
shows that the value function is a decreasing convex function of accumulated damages.




is a decreasing convex function of Xt−1.
As a higher value for Xt−1 means a more severe penalty in the event of detection,
it is unsurprising that the value of collusion is decreasing in the amount of accumulated
damages. It is also easy to explain why the value function is convex. Holding the price
path fixed and assuming collusion is infinitely-lived, a firm’s period t payoﬀ is linear and





τ−t+1 ωτ where ωτ is the probability of detection in period τ .11 Since the
cartel can partially mitigate the eﬀect of increased accumulated damages by adjusting
the price path to make detection less likely, the value function, at each value of Xt−1,
is bounded from below by a linear decreasing function of Xt−1 which is tangent to the
value function at that value of Xt−1. With this lower bound, the value function is then
(weakly) convex in Xt−1.
4 Properties of the Price Path
Given existence, the next step is to characterize the intertemporal structure of the price
path which will lay the foundation for then exploring how antitrust policy impacts cartel
pricing. Obviously, additional structure on the probability of detection function is required
to yield a useful characterization of cartel pricing. Previous static analyses of the influence
of antitrust law on cartel pricing assume the probability of detection depends only on the
price level and is an increasing function (for example, Block et al, 1981). I initially
explored this case but found nonsensical results; after raising price in the first period, the
cartel steadily lowers price (Harrington, 2001). The intuition is quite general. As firms
collude over time, one can show that accumulated damages on an optimal cartel price
path grow which means a higher penalty in the event of detection. Since the probability
of detection is increasing in price, a natural response to a higher potential penalty is to
lower price and thereby reduce the likelihood of detection. Thus, firms steadily lower
price over time so as to make detection less likely. To my knowledge, there is no empirical
evidence for such a cartel price path. Indeed, it is quite contrary to the steadily rising price
paths documented in the citric acid cartel of 1987-97 (Connor, 1998) and the graphite
electrodes cartel of 1992-97 (Levenstein and Suslow, 2001). In that a falling price path
is the logical implication of having detection depend only on the price level, I infer that
detection is not largely driven by the price level. A natural alternative is that detection
is driven instead by price changes. That is the avenue I will pursue here. However, I will
later explore allowing detection to depend on both price changes and price levels.
In specifying properties for the probability of detection function, the basic story to
have in mind is that the environment is perceived to be stable so that cartel members
expect buyers to anticipate price being fairly stable. Thus, bigger price changes - up
and even possibly down - are more likely to be perceived as anomalous and thus trigger
11 If collusion is finitely-lived then one has the same type of expression up until the final period of
collusion and then σ is relevant thereafter.
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suspicions about the presence of a cartel.
A6 ∃bφ : < → [0, 1] and g : Ω → <++, where g is a strictly positive, non-increasing,
continuously diﬀerentiable function, such that
φ
¡
P t, P t−1
¢
= bφ ¡¡P t − P t−1¢ g ¡P t−1¢¢ ∀ ¡P t, P t−1¢ ∈ Ω2.
A7 If x ≥ y ≥ 0 then bφ (x) ≥ bφ (y) .
A8 bφ (x) ≥ bφ (0) ∀x ∈ < and bφ (0) ∈ [0, 1) .
A9 ∃ε > 0 such that bφ is continuously diﬀerentiable in an ε-ball around ∀P 00 ∈ P 0,∀P 0 ∈
Ω and bφ0 (0) = 0.
A6-A8 specify that the probability of detection depends on the change in price, is
non-decreasing for price increases, and is minimized by keeping price constant. Note
that if g is a constant then the probability of detection depends only on the size of price




= 1/P t−1 then it depends on the percentage change in price.
A9 requires diﬀerentiability around a price change of zero and is a necessary technical
condition.12 Though we state bφ0 (0) = 0 as an assumption, it actually follows from A8
and assuming the derivative of bφ at a price change of zero is defined. Two additional
assumptions involving the profit function are required.
A10 π (P )− δbφ (0) h³γx(P )1−β ´+ Fi > bπ ∀P ∈ ³ bP, Pmi .
A11 ∃P ∗ ∈
³ bP, Pmi such that
π0 (P )−
h
δbφ (0) /³1− δβ ³1− bφ (0)´´i γx0 (P ) T 0 as P S P ∗.
In Harrington (2001), it is shown that A10 is suﬃcient to ensure that, at a steady state
price of P , colluding is preferable to not colluding. A11 requires quasi-concavity of an
income function which is defined to be profit less some multiple of damages. It is shown
later that these assumptions are satisfied under standard conditions on demand and cost
functions.
12 I want to acknowledge Ali Khan for the proper statement of A9. He developed an elegant example
which showed that a function can be diﬀerentiable at a point but not be diﬀerentiable in an ε-ball around
that point.
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4.1 Monotonicity of the Price Path
Theorem 3 shows that collusion is infinitely-lived, involves a non-decreasing price path,
and the long-run price is P ∗ (as defined in A11).13 These properties for the price path
are derived when firms choose to cartelize.14
Theorem 3 Assume A1-A11 and P 0 ∈
h bP, P ∗´. If it is optimal to form a cartel then it
is optimal to collude in all periods and if {P t}∞t=1 is an optimal price path then: i) it is
non-decreasing over time; and ii) P t → P ∗ as t→∞.
In spite of the generality of the structure, the price path is well-behaved in being
monotonic. The intuition is immediate. In that larger price movements result in a higher
probability of detection, the optimal price path has the cartel gradually increase price to
its long-run target value of P ∗ with the hope of not triggering suspicions. A numerical
example in Figure 1 shows a typical price path when the probability of detection function
is strictly increasing in price increases. Price starts at the non-collusive (Cournot) price
of 333 and is gradually raised; asymptoting a value of 470 which is below the simple
monopoly price of 500.15 Let me note that if the probability of detection is fixed at bφ (0)
- so that it is independent of price - then the cartel immediately increases price to P ∗ and
leaves it there. Intuitively, when the probability of detection is fixed then the expected
penalty associated with past damages is independent of what firms do (as long as they
continue colluding). Those damages are sunk. Hence, the optimal price doesn’t change
over time even though damages do grow.
Though the equations characterizing the dynamic path of price are rather complex,
there is a simple equation defining the long-run cartel price, P ∗, which makes it conducive
for performing comparative statics. P ∗ is defined as the unique solution to
π0 (P ∗)−
h
δbφ (0) /³1− δβ ³1− bφ (0)´´i γx0 (P ∗) = 0. (4)
13Without A11, the proof of Theorem 3 still establishes that the price path is non-decreasing and is
bounded from above by P∗. A11 serves to show that limt→∞P t = P∗.
14Here are two sets of suﬃcient conditions for cartel formation to occur when P 0 = bP and X0 = 0.
First, γ and F are suﬃciently small. Second, x
³ bP´ = 0 and F = 0. The first case is immediate and the
second case is shown in Harrington (2001). The latter is robust to small changes in the assumptions.
15The numerical analysis assumes market demand of 1000 − P t, constant marginal cost of zero, bP is






P t − bP´ ¡D ¡P t¢ /n¢, and σ = 0∀ ¡P t−1,Xt−1¢ .
Parameters are n = 2, β = .6, γ = 1, δ = .96, and F = 0. The probability of detection function is
φ
¡










so that raising the price 25% of the way from the
non-collusive to the simple monopoly price in one period results in a 50% chance of detection. More
numerical results are in Harrington (2001).
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The long-run cartel price then depends on the damage function and multiple, the rate
at which damages depreciate, and the probability of detection function. If the profit
function is concave (π00 < 0), the damage function is strictly increasing (γx0 > 0), and
the minimum probability of detection is positive (bφ (0) > 0) then P ∗ < Pm so that the
cartel price is bounded below the simple monopoly price in all periods. Thus, antitrust
law constrains pricing behavior. However, note that if γ = 0, so that the only penalty is
fixed fines, then it follows from (4) that P ∗ = Pm. At the steady-state, fixed fines do not
constrain the cartel’s price. It is true, however, that higher fines can be expected to aﬀect
the speed with which price is raised and, if fines are suﬃciently high, they can deter cartel
formation altogether. This is summarized as Remark 1.
Result 1 The steady state cartel price is less than the simple monopoly price when
penalties include damages. The steady-state cartel price equals the simple monopoly
price when the only penalty is fixed fines (assuming cartel formation occurs).
This independence result with respect to fines can be explained as follows. In the long
run, price settles down so that price changes converge to zero. Given that bφ0 (0) = 0,
marginal changes in price have no first-order eﬀect on the probability of detection though
continue to have a first-order eﬀect on the potential penalty through the damage function.
Thus, factors that influence the relationship between price and the size of the penalty -
the discount factor, the rate of depreciation of damages, the damage multiple, and the
damage function - all influence the long-run price. As a result, if there are only fines
and no damages then, as price changes go to zero, marginal changes in price have no
eﬀect on the expected penalty so that the cartel price converges to the simple monopoly
price. Recall that bφ0 (0) = 0 follows from diﬀerentiability of the probability of detection
function and that the probability of detection is minimized at a price change of zero; both
assumptions being quite reasonable when the environment is stationary. Thus, a fairly
general implication is that fixed penalties have no long-run eﬀect on the cartel price.
The independence of the steady-state cartel price with respect to fixed penalties is
in stark contrast to static models of collusive pricing in the presence of antitrust laws.
In those models, there is an equivalence between fines and damages in the sense that
any price resulting for some damage multiple could alternatively be generated through
an appropriately selected fine.16 In contrast, when detection depends on price changes
in a dynamic model, price is bounded below the simple monopoly price when penalties
16To see this point, consider a static model in which the cartel maximizes profit less expected penalties
and let ψ (P ) denote the probability of detection (note that it only depends on the price level). When
12
include damages but instead converges to the simple monopoly price when damages are
not deployed. Thus, if antitrust policy is intended to constrain cartel prices, even in the
long run, it is essential that penalties be responsive to the price charged.
Finally, the steady-state price can also be independent of the damage multiple though
it requires that damages are proportional to profit. If x (P t) = θπ (P t) for some θ > 0
then (4) once again implies P ∗ = Pm. For example, this proportionality occurs under
the standard damage formula of x (P t) =
³
P t − bP´ (D (P t) /n) when marginal cost is
constant and the but-for price is the competitive price.
4.2 Comparative Statics
Assume the market demand function, D (·), is twice diﬀerentiable and each firm has
constant marginal cost of c. A firm’s profit is then π (P ) = (P − c) (D (P ) /n) . Further
assume D00 (P ) ≤ 0 so that A1 holds. Next suppose that the damage function is x (P ) =³
P − bP´ (D (P ) /n) where bP > c. To ensure that A11 is satisfied, define
Ψ (P ) ≡ π (P )− κd (P ) = (1/n)
h
(P − c)D (P )− κ
³
P − bP´D (P )i
where κ ≡ δbφ (0) γ.³1− δβ ³1− bφ (0)´´ .
Note that if Ψ00 (P ) < 0 then P ∗ is defined by Ψ0 (P ∗) = 0. Taking the first two derivatives
of Ψ:
Ψ0 (P ) = (1/n)
n
(1− κ) [(P − c)D0 (P ) +D (P )] + κ
³ bP − c´D0 (P )o , (5)
Ψ00 (P ) = (1/n)
n
(1− κ) [2D0 (P ) + (P − c)D00 (P )] + κ
³ bP − c´D00 (P )o .
Ψ00 (P ) < 0 if κ < 1 and D00 ≤ 0. For P ∗ to exceed bP , one needs:
Ψ0
³ bP´ = (1/n)n( bP − c)D0 ³ bP´+ (1− κ)D ³ bP´o > 0. (6)
Since ( bP − c)D0 ³ bP´ + D ³ bP´ > 0, as bP is associated with the non-collusive outcome,
then Ψ0
³ bP´ > 0 if κ is suﬃciently close to zero which holds, for example, if either the
the penalty is damages, the expected penalty is ψ (P ) γx (P ) and when the penalty is fines, the expected
penalty is ψ (P )F. The optimal cartel price is defined by that price which equates marginal profit with






























































Thus, any price can be implemented either by fines or damages.
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probability of detection or the damage multiple is suﬃciently small. P ∗ is then defined
by:
(1− κ) [(P ∗ − c)D0 (P ∗) +D (P ∗)] + κ
³ bP − c´D0 (P ∗) = 0. (7)




[(P ∗ − c)D0 (P ∗) +D (P ∗)]−
³ bP − c´D0 (P ∗)
(1− κ) [2D0 (P ∗) + (P ∗ − c)D00 (P ∗)] + κ
³ bP − c´D00 (P ∗) < 0. (8)
It is straightforward to show that κ is increasing in γ, bφ (0) , β, and δ. The following
intuitive results are then immediate.
Result 2 The steady-state cartel price is reduced when: i) the damage multiple, γ, is
increased; ii) the probability of detection, bφ (·) , is increased; iii) the rate at which
damages persist over time, β, is increased; and iv) the discount factor, δ, is increased.
Numerical analysis reveals that when a change in a parameter causes the long-run
cartel price to fall (rise), the entire price path declines (rises); see Harrington (2001). The
first three results are quite immediate. To explain the last one, note that the cartel faces
an intertemporal trade-oﬀ in that a higher price in the current period raises current profit
but lowers the future payoﬀ by increasing the likelihood of detection and, in the event of
future detection, increasing the penalty. As cartel members become more patient, they
then prefer lower cartel prices.
A final interesting comparative static exercise is to consider the influence of the but-for
price, bP, on the steady-state cartel price. Recall that the but-for price is the price used
in calculating damages.17 It will be useful to generalize the damage function to:
x (P ) =
³
P − bP´hα (D (P ) /n) + (1− α)³D ³ bP´ /n´i (9)
where α ∈ [.5, 1] . U.S. antitrust practice is captured by α = 1 while if damages were
specified to equal the loss in consumer surplus then α = .5, using a linear approximation.
Note that as α falls, the cartel’s price has less of an influence on the level of demand used






³ bP´− αD0 (P ∗)i
(1− κα) [2D0 (P ∗) + (P ∗ − c)D00 (P ∗)] + κα
³ bP − c´D00 (P ∗) . (10)
17Actually, bP represents two diﬀerent prices: the non-collusive price and the but-for price. While, in
practice, they are intended to be the same, in principle they could be diﬀerent. The point to make is that
it is bP as the but-for price which influences the steady-state cartel price.
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As before, the denominator is negative. Since the numerator is increasing in α, it is
minimized at α = .5 and, therefore, the numerator is non-negative as long as D0
³ bP´ ≥
D0 (P ∗) . Since P ∗ > bP then D00 ≤ 0 implies D0 ³ bP´ ≥ D0 (P ∗) . This gives us the
following result.
Result 3 The steady-state cartel price is decreasing in the but-for price, ∂P ∗/∂ bP < 0.
To understand this result, first note that lowering bP raises the total amount of damages
by increasing the overcharge, which is the amount of damages assigned per unit of damage
demand. One response to a lower but-for price is to lower the cartel price so as to bring
back down the overcharge. Alternatively, firms could raise the cartel price so as to reduce
the number of units upon which damages are assessed. Given α is not too low - so that the
number of units used for the damage calculation is suﬃciently sensitive to the collusive
price - the latter eﬀect dominates. Surprisingly, the steady-state cartel price is then
decreasing in the but-for price. Thus, if the cartel anticipates that a more competitive
standard will be applied in calculating damages, this will result in a higher cartel price in
the long-run.
5 When Detection Depends on Both the Price Level
and Price Changes
As argued at the start of Section 4, counterfactual results about the pattern of prices
emerge when detection is assumed to depend only on the price level. More factual results
follow when detection is driven by price changes. However, it is possible that detection is
driven by both forces - being more likely when price changes are bigger and when price
levels are higher. In this section, numerical analysis is used to explore such a possibility.
As it turns out, allowing both a higher price level and bigger price changes to make
detection more likely generates some possibly identifying pricing patterns to a price-fixing
cartel.
Assume market demand is 1000−P t and each firm has constant marginal cost of zero.
Parameter values are n = 2, δ = .75, β = .95, γ = 1, and F = 0. The but-for price is
assumed to be the Cournot price, which is 333, and the simple monopoly price is 500.
The probability of detection is specified to be
φ
¡






P t − bP´2 + (1− λ)φ2 ¡P t − P t−1¢2 , 1¾ .
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When λ = 0 then detection is only sensitive to price movements and λ = 1 results in
detection depending only on the price level. φ0 is set equal to .01 so that the baseline
probability of detection is 1%. φ1 = .00000324 which implies that when λ = 1 then
setting the monopoly price results in a 10% chance of detection and φ2 = .00003204 so
that, when λ = 0, raising price from the non-collusive to the monopoly price in a single
period results in a 90% chance of detection. The optimal price path was calculated for
λ ∈ {0, .01, . . . , .99, 1} . All of the resulting price paths can be found at
www.econ.jhu.edu/People/Harrington/cartelpricing.avi
where, by clicking the image, an animated movie shows how the price path changes when
λ is raised from 0 to 1 so that the importance of the price level with regards to detection
is increased relative to that of price changes.
Typical of our findings is Figure 2 which depicts the optimal cartel price path when
λ = .15. The cartel begins by gradually raising price from 333 and thereby avoiding those
big price changes that are likely to induce suspicions about collusion. Price peaks at 462
around period 10 after which it gradually declines and converges to its steady-state value
of 448. I believe this pattern is quite general for the following reason. At the time of
cartel formation, price is at its non-collusive level so that the task before the cartel is to
raise price but to do so without triggering detection. This results in a gradual increase
in price. As price tends towards its steady-state value, price changes are going to zero
which means there is no first-order eﬀect of price changes on detection. While, with
price bounded above the non-collusive level, there is a first-order eﬀect on detection from
changing the price level. Hence, as price converges, the marginal impact of the price level
on detection is becoming large relative to the marginal impact of price changes. The price
path is then declining as the cartel seeks to lower the probability of detection with a lower
price level and thus oﬀset the fact that the penalty is increasing over time. By this logic,
I then conjecture that a general prediction of allowing for detection to largely depend on
price changes but also to be sensitive to the price level is that the price path will initially
rise and then moderately decline to its steady-state value.
6 Concluding Remarks
In choosing a price path, it is natural to expect a price-fixing cartel to try to avoid
creating suspicions that collusion is afoot. This paper is the first to explore how detection
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impacts cartel pricing in the context of a dynamic model when detection and penalties are
endogenous. Its contribution is two-fold. First, the intertemporal structure of the price
path is characterized. When detection depends on price changes, the cartel gradually
raises price. A more subtle property emerges when detection is driven by both price
changes and price levels. In that case, the initial phase in which price is gradually increased
is followed by having price moderately decline as it converges to its steady-state value.
The second contribution is exploring the impact of antitrust policy on the steady-state
price. Some of the ensuring results serve to alter our basic intuition. Based on static
models, there is generally thought to be an equivalence between damages and (fixed) fines
in the sense that if damages constrains the cartel to price at some level then there is a
fixed fine that will do so as well. That equivalence breaks down in a dynamic model.
When the only penalties are fines, the cartel’s steady-state price is exactly the simple
monopoly price. Antitrust policy fails to constrain the cartel. However, when damages
are used, the steady-state price is below the simple monopoly price and, furthermore, is
decreasing the damage multiple. A second accepted piece of intuition is that deployment
of a more competitive standard for calculating damages will induce the cartel to price
lower because now any given price has assigned to it a higher overcharge. I find just the
contrary is true. A lower but-for price induces the cartel to price higher.
The model and analysis of this paper is an initial attempt to develop a richer dynamic
theory of price-fixing cartels by taking account of their illegality and the desire of firms
to avoid detection. There are many directions that one can go from here. With this
particular model, there is a need to take account of (binding) equilibrium conditions so as
to ensure that, more generally, firms do not want to deviate from the cartel price path. Of
particular interest is to explore how antitrust policy interacts with these conditions. To
what extent do concerns about detection make cheating more or less desirable and what
is the role of antitrust policy in destabilizing the internal stability of cartels?
A second set of extensions is to encompass leniency programs. There have been a
number of interesting papers exploring how leniency - in the form of allowing cartel
members who provide evidence to receive reduced penalties - aﬀects the degree of collusion
and welfare. That work, however, does not take into account the endogeneity of detection
and antitrust penalties. The central set of questions in that literature revolve around the
optimal form of leniency. Should all firms be able to apply for leniency or just the first to
come forward (as with the U.S. program)? While in both Europe and the U.S. leniency
means avoidance of fines (also prison sentences in the U.S.), this leaves a firm still liable
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for damages in the U.S. (and there are no damages in Europe). What diﬀerence does it
make that some but not all penalties are avoided?
A third extension is related to the fact that detection has been assumed to depend
only on movements in a common firm price. However, suspicions about collusion are also
generated by firms’ prices moving in tandem. If buyers may infer, rightly or wrongly,
from parallel price movements that a cartel is present, this will also have implications for
pricing behavior.
In conclusion, by taking into account the issue of detection, theory may eventually
be able to empirically distinguish between explicit and tacit collusion. Tacit collusion
I define as when firms engage in a pricing arrangement that serves to raise price and
is achieved without explicit communication. While it is possible to prosecute tacitly
colluding firms, it is very diﬃcult. Explicit collusion is when firms engage in direct
communication regarding the setting of prices (or some other form of collusion such as
market allocation). Explicit collusion is clearly an antitrust violation. While antitrust case
law makes a critical distinction between explicit and tacit collusion, existing collusive
pricing theories do not.18 However, if explicit collusion is illegal and tacit collusion is
not (or at least it is considerably more diﬃcult to prove illegality) then concerns about
detection are much more important when firms have formed a price-fixing cartel (or what
is called a “hard-core cartel” in policy circles). In the model of this paper, all pricing
dynamics are driven by concerns about detection and penalties. Indeed, if tacit collusion
is legal then the joint profit-maximizing price path under successful tacit collusion is to
price at the simple monopoly price in all periods. This is strikingly diﬀerent from the
hard-core cartel price path in which price gradually rises and is bounded below the simple
monopoly price. The qualitatively diﬀerent pricing dynamics between explicit and tacit
collusion oﬀers some hope to distinguish between the two forms of collusion. This is quite
important for policy purposes as it is best if the antitrust authority allocates its resources
to prosecuting explicit collusion for there is both more hope of achieving a conviction and
in deterring the formation of hard-core cartels.
18There are a few exceptions. McCutcheon (1997) models meetings between firms. Athey, Bagwell,
and Sanchirico (1998) and Athey and Bagwell (2001) model the exchange of cost information by firms
which would seem more appropriate for explicit than tacit collusion (though such exchange could still
occur through a trade association).
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1 The proof is an adaptation of arguments in Stokey and Lucas
(1989). Begin by supposing that the cartel has been formed and let v : Ω× £0, X¤ → <
be a continuous (and necessarily bounded) function. Note that the boundedness of x and
β < 1 imply Xt is bounded and we let X denote such a bound. Let T be a function with
domain B which is the space of continuous functions that map Ω × £0,X¤ into <. T is
defined as follows:
T (v (·)) = max
P∈Ω











max{v ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢ ,
(bπ/ (1− δ))− σ ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢}.
By A1-A5 and the presumption that v is a continuous function, the above problem involves
maximizing a continuous function over a compact set. Hence, T (v (·)) exists by the
Theorem of the Maximum (Theorem 3.6, Stokey and Lucas, 1989). As π, φ, x, σ, and
v are continuous functions and Ω is compact, T is a continuous function (Theorem 3.6,
Stokey and Lucas, 1989). Hence, the range of T is B so that T : B → B.
To show that T is a contraction, Blackwell’s theorem is used (Theorem 3.3, Stokey
and Lucas, 1989). This requires showing that T satisfies monotonicity and discounting.
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max{vo ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢+ a,
(bπ/ (1− δ))− σ ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢}
≤ max
P











max{vo ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢ ,
(bπ/ (1− δ))− σ ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢}+ δ £1− φ ¡P, P t−1¢¤ a
≤ max
P











max{vo ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢ ,








As δ ∈ (0, 1), T is a contraction. Since the space of continuous functions over a compact
subset of Euclidean space is a complete metric space (in the sup metric) then, by the
Contraction Mapping Theorem (Theorem 3.2, Stokey and Lucas, 1989), T has a unique
fixed point which is a continuous function. This fixed point is the value function, V. Since
then











max{V ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢ ,
(bπ/ (1− δ))− σ ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢}
is a continuous function and Ω is compact, an optimal price path exists.




≥ bπ/ (1− δ)





< bπ/ (1− δ) then it is not optimal to form the cartel and the optimal
price path is bP in all periods. ¥
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P, βXt−1 + γx (P )
¢
,
(bπ/ (1− δ))− σ ¡P, βXt−1 + γx (P )¢}.
Given A1-A5, it follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem that V (·) = limh→∞ vh (·) .
Any property that holds for the sequence of functions {vh (·)}∞h=1 then holds for V (·) .
Suppose vh (·) is decreasing in Xt−1. Since σ (·) is nondecreasing in Xt−1 then
max {vh (·) , (bπ/ (1− δ))− σ (·)} is nondecreasing in Xt−1. Using this fact along with£
(bπ/ (1− δ))− βXt−1 − γx (P )− F ¤ being decreasing in Xt−1, it follows that vh+1 (·) is
decreasing in Xt−1. Therefore, V (·) is decreasing in Xt−1.
Suppose vh (·) is convex in Xt−1. As σ (·) is concave in Xt−1 and, since the max-
imum of convex functions is convex, then max {vh (·) , (bπ/ (1− δ))− σ (·)} is convex in
Xt−1.19 Next note that
£
(bπ/ (1− δ))− βXt−1 − γx (P )− F ¤ is convex in Xt−1. Thus,
the function being maximized on the rhs of (13) is convex in Xt−1. As vh+1 (·) is simply
the maximum of a collection of convex functions - each one parameterized by a diﬀerent
element of Ω - then vh+1 (·) is convex in Xt−1. ¥
Proof of Theorem 3 There are several steps in the proof. First, it is shown that if
it is optimal to form a cartel then it is optimal to collude forever. Second, the optimal
price path is bounded above by P ∗. Third, the optimal price path is non-decreasing over
time. Fourth, the optimal price path converges to P ∗.
• It is optimal to collude forever.
The strategy is to show that if it is optimal to collude in, say, period T then it must be
optimal to collude in period T + 1. Assume it is optimal to form a cartel. It is suﬃcient









that the terminal payoﬀ from stopping collusion is bπ/ (1− δ). Suppose it is optimal to
19Suppose u1 (·) , u2 (·) , . . . , uk (·) are convex in z. To show that U (·) ≡ max {u1 (·) , u2 (·) , . . . , uk (·)}
is convex, suppose to the contrary. This means that ∃z0, z00 and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
λU (z0) + (1− λ)U (z00) < U (λz0 + (1− λ) z00) . Suppose U (z0) = ui (z0), U (z00) = uj (z00) , and
U (λz0 + (1− λ) z00) = uk (λz0 + (1− λ) z00) . The condition is then: λui (z0) + (1− λ)uj (z00) <
uk (λz0 + (1− λ) z00) . Since ui (z0) ≥ uk (z0) and uj (z00) ≥ uk (z00) , it follows that: λuk (z0) +
(1− λ)uk (z00) < uk (λz0 + (1− λ) z00) , but this contradicts the assumption that uk (·) is convex.
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The lhs is the payoﬀ from colluding in T and stopping collusion as of T + 1 and the rhs
















For it to be optimal to dismantle the cartel in T + 1, it is necessary that:
bπ




− δbφ (0) £β ¡βXT−1 + γx ¡PT ¢¢+ γx ¡PT ¢+ F ¤+ δbπ
1− δ ⇔
bπ > π ¡PT ¢− δbφ (0) £β ¡βXT−1 + γx ¡PT ¢¢+ γx ¡PT ¢+ F ¤ . (15)
The rhs of the first line in (15) is the payoﬀ from maintaining a price of PT in T + 1 and



















≥ bπ > π ¡PT ¢− δbφ (0) £β ¡βXT−1 + γx ¡PT ¢¢+ γx ¡PT ¢+ F ¤ .



















− δbφ (0) £β ¡βXT−1 + γx ¡PT ¢¢+ γx ¡PT ¢+ F ¤
or
bφ (0) £β ¡βXT−1 + γx ¡PT ¢¢+ γx ¡PT ¢+ F ¤ > φ ¡PT , PT−1¢ £βXT−1 + γx ¡PT ¢+ F ¤ .
























(1− β) > X
T−1.
Intuitively, if it is optimal to collude at a price of PT in period T but it is not optimal
to do so in T + 1 then damages must be higher in T + 1. For that to be the case, what




, must exceed the amount of damages lost through
depreciation, (1− β)XT−1. This produces the above condition.
20The assumption is used that a firm must strictly prefer not to collude for it to dissolve the cartel.
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Next note that it is never optimal for the cartel price to exceed the simple monopoly
price of Pm. Relative to a price of Pm, a higher price yields strictly lower current profit,
weakly higher damages, and, as price initially starts below Pm, a weakly higher probability
of detection. It is straightforward to show that a price path with prices above Pm yields
a lower payoﬀ to one in which all those prices exceeding Pm are replaced with Pm. Since















/ (1− β) , (16) contra-
dicts (15). This contradiction establishes that the claim that collusion stops in finite time
is false.
• The optimal price path is bounded above by P ∗.
The proof strategy is to show that if the price path ever exceeds P ∗ that a higher
payoﬀ is realized by pricing at P ∗ forever, starting in the period with which price first
exceeds P ∗.
Assuming firms collude forever and using the representation of the payoﬀ in (25), the
































































































is the expected present
value of damages associated with colluding in that period.
Suppose it is not true that price is bounded above by P ∗ so ∃t0 such that P t
0
> P ∗ ≥
P
t0−1
. If this price path is optimal then, starting from period t0, it must yield at least as




























































1− bφ (0)it−t0−1 hπ (P ∗)− e∆tγx (P ∗)− (bπ − (1− δ)F )i¾
where








1− bφ (0)iτ−t0−1 bφ (0)) ,




1− bφ (0)iτ−t bφ (0) , t ≥ t0 + 1
and recall that φ (P ∗, P ∗) = bφ (0) . To show that ∆t ≥ e∆t∀t ≥ t0, first note that these




























































is the probability of detection over periods to + 1, . . . ,∞.

















> P ∗ ≥ P t
0−1















t−1´ ≥ bφ (0) , t ≥ t0 + 1. The probability of detection in







for the alternative price path ∀t ≥ t0. It is concluded that ∆t ≥ e∆t∀t ≥ t0.
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Consider the lhs expression in (18). Since it is non-increasing in ∆
t
and ∆
t ≥ e∆t∀t ≥
t0, the expression is weakly increased if e∆t replaces ∆t ∀t ≥ t0. It follows that if (18) holds














































1− bφ (0)it−t0−1 hπ (P ∗)− e∆tγx (P ∗)− (bπ − (1− δ)F )i¾ .
The objective is to establish that a contradiction follows from (19). The first step is to
show that the summation term on the rhs is at least as great as the summation term on
the lhs. As e∆t = δbφ (0) / h1− δβ ³1− bφ (0)´i, it follows from A11 that
π (P ∗)− e∆tγx (P ∗) ≥ π ³P t´− e∆tγx³P t´ , t ≥ t0 + 1.
Given δbφ (0) / (1− β) ≥ e∆t, A10 implies π (P ∗) − e∆tγx (P ∗) > bπ + δbφ (0)F and thus















, t ≥ t0 + 1.

















































≥ γx (P ∗) (so that the lhs is decreasing in e∆t0 at a faster rate than the






− e∆tγx³P t0´ ≥ π (P ∗)− e∆tγx (P ∗) .
Since e∆t = δbφ (0) / h1− δβ ³1− bφ (0)´i and P t0 > P ∗, this cannot be true by A11. This
proves that the price path is bounded above by P ∗.
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• The optimal price path is non-decreasing over time.
The proof strategy involves two parts. First, suppose that price falls from t0 − 1
to t0 and furthermore that price never exceeds its level prior to the decline, that is,
P t
0−1 ≥ P t∀t ≥ t0. It is shown that a higher payoﬀ is realized when price is kept constant
at P t
0−1∀t ≥ t0. Second, suppose that price falls from t0− 1 to t0 and remains at or below
P t
0−1 over periods t0+1, ..., t00. It is then shown that a higher payoﬀ is realized by skipping
the price path over periods t0+1, ..., t00 and jumping to a price of P t
00+1 in period t0, P t
00+2







is an optimal price path and it is not non-decreasing over time.




. A necessary condition for















































− (bπ − (1− δ)F )i












1− bφ (0)it−t0 hπ ³P t0−1´− e∆γx³P t0−1´− (bπ − (1− δ)F )i
+ [bπ/ (1− δ)− F ]




1− bφ (0)iτ−t bφ (0) .





t0−1 ≥ P t∀t ≥ t0+1 then (21) cannot
be true; maintaining price at P
t0−1
forever is superior. Recall that price is bounded above
by P ∗ so that P


























− e∆γx³P t´− (bπ − (1− δ)F )i
+ [bπ/ (1− δ)− F ] .
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1− bφ (0)it−t0 hπ ³P t0−1´− e∆γx³P t0−1´− (bπ − (1− δ)F )i
To show that the summation term on the rhs is at least as great as that on the lhs, first




t0−1´−e∆γx³P t0−1´−(bπ − (1− δ)F ) ≥ π ³P t´−e∆γx³P t´−(bπ − (1− δ)F ) , t ≥ t0+1.
as, by supposition, P
t0−1 ≥ P t∀t ≥ t0+1 and it has already been proven that P ∗ ≥ P t
0−1
.










t0−1´− e∆γx³P t0−1´− (bπ − (1− δ)F ) > 0,
∀t ≥ t0 + 1 because P t
0−1
, P
t ≤ Pm and e∆ ≤ δbφ (0) / (1− β). Finally,
h









, t ≥ t0 + 1.
It is concluded that the summation term on the rhs of (22) is at least as great as the











t0−1 ≤ P ∗, this contradicts A11. It is concluded that the price path
cannot be bounded above by P
t0−1





then ∃t00 ≥ t0 such that P t
0−1 ≥ P t
0+1







. Once again compare this price path with one in which price is kept constant at
P
t0−1







lower at t0 and is weakly lower at periods t0 + 1, . . . , t00. Hence, a necessary condition for
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1− bφ (0)it−t00−1 × hπ ³P t0−1´− e∆γx³P t0−1´− (bπ − (1− δ)F )i ≡ X.







set P t = P
t+t00−t0+1







worse than a constant price of P
t0−1













can then be earned by skipping the prices over t0, . . . , t00 and start
pricing in t0 according to the price path as of t00 + 1.









































1− bφ (0)it−t0 hπ ³P t0−1´− e∆γx³P t0−1´− (bπ − (1− δ)F )i .
Note that Z = z/ (1− θ) . In this notation, (21) takes the form:
y + ξY −∆t
0
βXt
0−1 + [bπ/ (1− δ)− F ] ≥ z + θZ − e∆βXt0−1 + [bπ/ (1− δ)− F ] .
Consider:
Y − (y + ξY ) = (1− ξ)Y − y > (1− ξ)Y − z = (1− ξ)Y − (1− θ)Z > 0.
The last inequality follows from θ ≥ ξ and that it has been shown that (21) implies
Y > Z. It is then true that: Y > y + ξY. Now consider the payoﬀ starting from t0
in which P t = P
t+t00−t0+1




0−1+[bπ/ (1− δ)− F ] . As defined, Y is the payoﬀ from nP to∞
t=t0
starting in t00+1
and discounting back to t00 + 1 with an initial price of P
t00
. It is also the payoﬀ from
P t = P
t+t00−t0+1
for t ≥ t0, starting in t0 and discounting back to t0 but with one caveat.






























so that, by A7, the probability of detection at t0 from the price path P t = P
t+t00−t0+1






.21 Thus, the associated payoﬀ is weakly
higher than Y −∆t
0
βXt
0−1 + [bπ/ (1− δ)− F ] .
To summarize, it has been shown that a price path of P t = P
t+t00−t0+1
for t ≥ t0
yields a payoﬀ of at least Y −∆t
0
βXt
0−1+[bπ/ (1− δ)− F ] while nP to∞
t=t0
yields a payoﬀ
of y + ξY − ∆t
0
βXt
0−1 + [bπ/ (1− δ)− F ] . Since Y > y + ξY then the former is larger






. This contradiction shows the falsity of the




. It is concluded that the
price path is non-decreasing.
• The optimal price path converges to P ∗.







optimal price path then it is non-decreasing and is bounded above by P ∗. Therefore,
limt→∞ P t exists and is denoted P. Consider a price path in which P t = P
t
for t < T
21This is the only step in the proof that requires g to be a non-increasing function.
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and P t = P
t



































































































when ε = 0. Optimality
requires that if the derivative of the payoﬀ with respect to ε is defined then it equals 0 at
















= bφ³³P t − P t−1´ g ³P t−1 + ε´´ , t > T
When the derivative of φ is taken, it’ll be replaced with its alternative representation ofbφ for purposes of the analysis.






















































































































































































































































Optimality requires that this derivative (if defined) equals zero at ε = 0, ∀T. Consider





bφ0 ³³PT − PT−1´ g ³PT−1´´ g ³PT−1´ = bφ0 (0) = 0
lim
T→∞
bφ0 ³³P t − P t−1´ g ³P t−1´´ g0 ³P t−1´ = bφ0 (0) = 0, t > T.
Since bφ0 (0) is defined by A9, then the above derivative of the payoﬀ function is defined.














1− bφ (0)i t−1Y
j=T+1
h


















1− bφ (0)´ ,
where ∆ ≡ δ
∞X
τ=t
(δβ)τ−t bφ (0) h1− bφ (0)iτ−t = δbφ (0)
1− δβ
³
1− bφ (0)´ .
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= 0 which, by A11, implies P = P ∗.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3. ¥
Appendix B
Key to our analysis is a useful representation of a firm’s payoﬀ. To save on notation,
let φt ≡ φ
¡
P t, P t−1
¢
denote the probability of detection in period t, as of the start of
period t. Suppose collusion is infinitely-lived (subject to detection interrupting it) and
































(bπ/ (1− δ))− β3Xt−1 − β2γx ¡P t¢− βγx ¡P t+1¢− γx ¡P t+2¢− F ¤+ · · ·
A firm earns π (P t) in the current period. With probability φt, detection occurs which
results in bπ in all future periods and a penalty of βXt−1 + γx (P t) + F. With probability




is earned in period t+ 1 and so forth. This
expression can be re-arranged to:





























φt+3 + · · ·
i








































[π (P τ )− γx (P τ )∆τ ] (24)







The collusive payoﬀ is represented as the stream of profit net of the expected present value









less the expected present value of inherited damages, βXt−1∆t, plus the value from not
colluding, (bπ/ (1− δ)) δP∞τ=t δτ−tφτΠτ−1j=t ¡1− φj¢ .
Let us manipulate the term [(bπ/ (1− δ))− F ] δP∞τ=t δτ−tφτΠτ−1j=t ¡1− φj¢:






= [(bπ/ (1− δ))− F ]©δφt + δ2 ¡1− φt¢φt+1 + δ3 ¡1− φt¢ ¡1− φt+1¢φt+2 + · · ·ª



















δτ + · · ·
)















+ · · · }























− · · · ]
= [(bπ/ (1− δ))− F ]− [bπ − (1− δ)F ]×















+ · · · }
= [(bπ/ (1− δ))− F ]− [bπ − (1− δ)F ]×









+ · · · }













¢ {[π (P τ )− γx (P τ )∆τ ]− [bπ − (1− δ)F ]} (25)
−βXt−1∆t + [(bπ/ (1− δ))− F ] .
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